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Abstract—We consider wireless sensor networks under a het-
erogeneous random key predistribution scheme and an on-off
channel model. The heterogeneous key predistribution scheme
has recently been introduced by Yag˘an - as an extension to the
Eschenauer and Gligor scheme - for the cases when the network
consists of sensor nodes with varying level of resources and/or
connectivity requirements, e.g., regular nodes vs. cluster heads.
The network is modeled by the intersection of the inhomogeneous
random key graph (induced by the heterogeneous scheme) with
an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph (induced by the on/off channel model).
We present conditions (in the form of zero-one laws) on how
to scale the parameters of the intersection model so that with
high probability all of its nodes are connected to at least k other
nodes; i.e., the minimum node degree of the graph is no less
than k. We also present numerical results to support our results
in the finite-node regime. The numerical results suggest that the
conditions that ensure k-connectivity coincide with those ensuring
the minimum node degree being no less than k.
Index Terms—Wireless Sensor Networks, Security, Inhomoge-
neous Random Key Graphs, k-Connectivity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) comprise low-cost, low-
power, small sensor nodes that are typically deployed in hostile
environments [1]. WSNs have numerous applications includ-
ing military, health, and environmental monitoring, among oth-
ers [1]. Ensuring secure communications in WSNs is expected
to be a key challenge [2] given several limiting factors; e.g.,
limited computational capabilities, limited transmission power,
lack of a priori knowledge of deployment configuration, and
vulnerability to node capture attacks. Random key predistri-
bution schemes have been proposed with these limitations in
mind and they have become widely regarded as the most
feasible solutions in securing WSNs; e.g., see [3, Chapter 13]
and [4], and references therein.
Random key predistribution schemes were first proposed by
Eschenauer and Gligor [5]. Their scheme, hereafter referred to
as the EG scheme, operates as follows: prior to deployment,
each sensor node is assigned a random set of K keys from a
key pool of size P . Once deployed, two nodes can securely
communicate only if they have at least one key in common.
The EG scheme paved the way to several other variants, in-
cluding the q-composite scheme [6], and the random pairwise
scheme [6] among others. Recently, Yag˘an introduced a new
variation of the EG scheme, referred to as the heterogeneous
key predistribution scheme [7]. The heterogeneous scheme
addresses the case when the WSN comprises sensor nodes with
varying level of resources and/or connectivity requirements,
e.g., regular nodes vs. cluster heads, which is likely to hold for
many WSN applications [8]. It is described as follows. Given r
classes, each sensor node is independently classified as a class-
i node with probability µi > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , r. Then,
sensors in class-i are each given Ki keys selected uniformly
at random from a key pool of size P . As before, sensors
that share key(s) can communicate securely over an available
channel after the deployment; see Section II for details.
In [7], Yag˘an established critical conditions on the prob-
ability distribution µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr}, the key ring sizes
K = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kr}, and the key pool size P as a function
of the network size n, so that the resulting WSN is securely
connected with high probability. Although these results form
a crucial starting point towards the analysis of feasibility of
the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme, there remains
to establish several important properties of the scheme to
obtain a fuller understanding of its performance in securing
WSNs. In particular, the connectivity results given in [7] were
obtained under the assumption of full visibility; i.e., that all
pairs of sensors have a communication channel in between.
This assumption is not likely to hold in practical WSNs
given that the wireless medium of the communication is often
unreliable and sensors typically have limited communication
ranges. Moreover, the results in [7] do not provide any
information on the reliability of network connectivity against
sensor or link failures. Reliability of WSNs is crucial since
sensors may fail due to battery depletion or may get captured
by an adversary, and wireless links may fail due to harsh
environmental conditions.
Our paper completes a crucial first step towards address-
ing both of the aforementioned limitations of the results by
Yag˘an in [7]. First of all, we consider the heterogeneous key
predistribution scheme under non-full visibility. In particular,
we consider an on/off communication model consisting of
independent wireless channels each of which is either on (with
probability α), or off (with probability 1 − α). Secondly, we
focus on the k-connectivity property which implies that the
network connectivity is preserved despite the failure of any
(k−1) nodes or links [9]. Accordingly, k-connectivity provides
a guarantee of network reliability against the potential failures
of sensors or links.
Our approach is based on modeling the WSN by an appro-
priate random graph and then establishing scaling conditions
on the model parameters such that certain desired properties
hold with high probability (whp) as the number of nodes
n gets large. The heterogeneous key predistribution scheme
induces the inhomogeneous random key graph [7], denoted
hereafter by K(n,µ,K, P ), while the on/off communication
model leads to the standard Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graph [10],
denoted by G(n, α). Hence, the appropriate random graph
model here is the intersection of the inhomogeneous random
key graph with ER graph, denoted K ∩G(n;µ,K, P, α).
Our main result (see Theorem 3.1) is a zero-one law for
the minimum node degree of K ∩G(n;µ,K, P, α) to be no
less than k for any non-negative integer k. More precisely,
we present conditions on how to scale the parameters of
K ∩G(n;µ,K, P, α) so that its minimum node degree is no
less than k with high probability when the number of nodes
n gets large. The zero-law for minimum node degree being
no less than k already implies the zero-law for k-connectivity
since a graph can not be k-connected unless all nodes have
degree at least k. Furthermore, we show by simulations that
minimum node degree being no less than k and k-connectivity
properties exhibit almost equal (empirical) probabilities, which
prompts us to conjecture that the one-law of k-connectivity
will also follow under the same critical scaling and conditions
provided here; see Section IV for details.
Throughout, an event is said to hold with high probability
(whp) if it holds with probability 1 as n→∞. For sequences
{an}, {bn}, we use an = o(bn), an = ω(bn), and an = O(bn)
with their meaning in the standard Landau notation.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a network consisting of n sensor nodes labeled
as v1, v2, . . . , vn. Each sensor node is assigned to one of the
possible r classes, e.g., priority levels, according to a proba-
bility distribution µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for each
i = 1, . . . , r; clearly it is also needed that
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Prior
to deployment, each class-i node is given Ki cryptographic
keys selected uniformly at random from a pool of size P .
Hence, the key ring Σx of node vx is a PKtx -valued random
variable (rv) where PA denotes the collection of all subsets of
{1, . . . , P} with exactly A elements and tx denotes the class
of node vx. The rvs Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σn are then i.i.d. with
P[Σx = S | tx = i] =
(
P
Ki
)
−1
, S ∈ PKi .
After the deployment, two sensors can communicate securely
over an existing communication channel if they have at least
one key in common.
Throughout, we let K = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kr}, and assume
without loss of generality that K1 ≤ K2 ≤ . . . ≤ Kr.
Consider a random graph K induced on the vertex set V =
{v1, . . . , vn} such that two distinct nodes vx and vy are
adjacent in K, denoted by the event Kxy, if they have at least
one cryptographic key in common, i.e.,
Kxy := [Σx ∩ Σy 6= ∅] . (1)
The adjacency condition (1) characterizes the inhomogeneous
random key graph K(n;µ,K, P ) as introduced recently by
Yag˘an [7]. This model is also known in the literature as the
general random intersection graph; e.g., see [11]–[13].
The inhomogeneous random key graph models the crypto-
graphic connectivity of the underlying WSN. In particular, the
probability that a class-i node and a class-j node are adjacent,
denoted by pij is given by
pij = P[Kxy] = 1−
(
P −Ki
Kj
)/(
P
Kj
)
(2)
as long as Ki+Kj ≤ P ; otherwise if Ki+Kj > P , we clearly
have pij = 1. We also find it useful define the mean probability
λi of edge occurrence for a class-i node in K(n;µ,K, P ).
With arbitrary nodes vx and vy , we have
λi = P[Kxy | tx = i] =
r∑
j=1
pijµj , i = 1, . . . , r, (3)
as we condition on the class ty of node vy .
In this work, we consider the communication topology
of the WSN as consisting of independent channels that are
either on (with probability α) or off (with probability 1− α).
More precisely, let {Bij(α), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} denote i.i.d
Bernoulli rvs, each with success probability α. The commu-
nication channel between two distinct nodes vx and vy is on
(respectively off) if Bxy(α) = 1 (respectively if Bxy(α) = 0).
This simple on/off channel model enables a comprehensive
analysis of the properties of interest of the resulting WSN, e.g.,
its connectivity, and was shown to be a good approximation
to the more realistic disk model [14], [15] in many similar
settings; e.g., see [16]–[18]. The on/off channel model induces
a standard Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph G(n;α) [19], defined on the
vertices V = {v1, . . . , vn} such that vx and vy are adjacent,
denoted Cxy , if Bxy(α) = 1.
We model the overall topology of a WSN by the intersection
of the inhomogeneous random key graph K(n;µ,K, P ) with
the ER graph G(n;α). Namely, nodes vx and vy are adjacent
in K ∩G(n;µ,K, P, α), denoted Exy , if and only if they
are adjacent in both K and G. In other words, the edges
in the intersection graph K ∩G(n;µ,K, P, α) represent pairs
of sensors that can securely communicate as they have i)
a communication link available in between, and ii) shared
cryptographic key(s). Therefore, studying the connectivity
properties of K ∩G(n;µ,K, P, α) amounts to studying the
secure connectivity of heterogenous WSNs under the on/off
channel model.
To simplify the notation, we let θ = (µ,K, P ), and Θ =
(θ, α). The probability of edge existence between a class-i
node vx and a class-j node vy in K ∩G(n;Θ) is given by
P[Exy
∣∣∣ tx = i, ty = j] = P[Kxy∩Cxy | tx = i, ty = j] = αpij
by independence. Similar to (3), the mean edge probability for
a class-i node in K ∩G(n;Θ), denoted by Λi, is given by
Λi =
r∑
j=1
µjαpij = αλi, i = 1, . . . , r. (4)
Throughout, we assume that the number of classes r is
fixed and does not scale with n, and so are the probabilities
µ1, . . . , µr. All of the remaining parameters are assumed to
be scaled with n.
III. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We refer to a mapping K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 as a
scaling (for the inhomogeneous random key graph) as long as
the conditions
2 ≤ K1,n ≤ K2,n ≤ . . . ≤ Kr,n ≤ Pn/2 (5)
are satisfied for all n = 2, 3, . . .. Similarly any mapping α :
N0 → (0, 1) defines a scaling for the ER graphs. As a result,
a mapping Θ : N0 → Nr+10 × (0, 1) defines a scaling for
the intersection graph K ∩G(n;Θn) given that condition (5)
holds. We remark that under (5), the edge probabilities pij
will be given by (2).
Our main result is a zero-one law for the minimum node
degree being no less than k in the inhomogeneous random key
graph intersecting ER graph.
Theorem 3.1: Consider a probability distribution µ =
(µ1, µ2, . . . , µr) with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r, a scaling
K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 , and a scaling α : N0 → (0, 1).
Let the sequence γ : N0 → R be defined through
Λ1(n) = αnλ1(n) =
logn+ (k − 1) log logn+ γn
n
, (6)
for each n = 1, 2, . . ..
(a) If λ1(n) = o(1), we have
lim
n→∞
P
[
Minimum node degree of
K ∩G(n;Θn) is at least k
]
= 0 if lim
n→∞
γn = −∞
(b) We have
lim
n→∞
P
[
Minimum node degree of
K ∩G(n;Θn) is at least k
]
= 1 if lim
n→∞
γn =∞.
In words, Theorem 3.1 states that the minimum node
degree in K ∩G(n;Θn) is greater than or equal k whp if
the mean degree of class-1 nodes (i.e., nΛ1(n)) is scaled as
(logn+ (k − 1) log logn+ γn) for some sequence γn satis-
fying limn→∞ γn = ∞. On the other hand, if the sequence
γn satisfies limn→∞ γn = −∞, then whp K ∩G(n;Θn)
has at least one node with degree strictly less than k. This
shows that the critical scaling for the minimum node degree
of K ∩G(n;Θn) being greater than or equal k is given by
Λ1(n) =
logn+(k−1) log log n
n
, with the sequence γn : N0 → R
measuring the deviation of Λ1(n) from the critical scaling.
The zero-one law established here for the minimum node
degree of K ∩G(n;Θn) shall be regarded as a crucial first
step towards establishing a similar result on its k-connectivity;
namely the property that the graph will remain connected
despite the deletion of any k− 1 nodes or edges. In fact, The-
orem 3.1 already implies the zero-law for the k-connectivity,
i.e., that
lim
n→∞
P
[
K ∩G(n;µ,Θn)
is k-connected
]
= 0 if lim
n→∞
γn = −∞.
This is because a graph can not be k-connected unless all
its nodes have degree at least k. Also, for several classes of
random graphs it is known that the conditions that ensure
k-connectivity coincide with those ensuring minimum node
degree to be at least k; e.g., random key graphs [20], ER
graphs [19], and random geometric key graphs [9]. Here we
confirm this via numerical simulations (see Section IV) for
the intersection of inhomogeneous random key graph and ER
graph, prompting us to cast the following conjecture.
Conjecture 3.2: Consider a probability distribution µ =
(µ1, µ2, . . . , µr) with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r, a scaling
K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 , and a scaling α : N0 → (0, 1).
Let the sequence γ : N0 → R be defined through (6). With
λ1(n) = o(1) and possibly under some additional conditions,
we have
lim
n→∞
P
[
K ∩G(n;Θn)
is k-connected
]
=
{
0 if limn→∞ γn = −∞
1 if limn→∞ γn = +∞
We comment on the additional technical condition λ1(n) =
o(1). This is enforced here mainly for technical reasons
for the proof of the zero-law of Theorem 3.1 to work. A
similar condition on the edge probability of the (homogeneous)
random key graph was required in [20] for obtaining the zero-
law for the minimum node degree being no less than k in the
(homogeneous) random key graph intersecting ER graph. In
view of [7, Lemma 4.2], this condition is equivalent to
KminKavg = o(Pn),
with Kmin and Kavg denoting the minimum and mean key ring
sizes, respectively. Considering the fact that key pool size P
is expected to be orders of magnitude larger than any key ring
size in the network [7] this condition would be satisfied in
most WSN implementations.
In comparison with the existing literature on similar models,
our result can be seen to extend the work by Zhao et al. [20]
on the homogeneous random key graph intersecting ER graph
to the heterogeneous setting. There, zero-one laws for the
property that the minimum node degree is no less than k and
the property that the graph is k-connected were established for
K ∩G(n,K, P, αn). With r = 1, i.e., when all nodes belong
to the same class and thus receive the same number K of
keys, Theorem 3.1 recovers the result of Zhao et al. for the
property that the minimum node degree is no less than k (See
[20, Theorem 1]).
Our paper can also be seen as an extension of the work
by Yag˘an [7] who considered the inhomogeneous random
key graph K(n,µ,K, P ) under full visibility; i.e., when all
pairs of nodes have a communication channel in between.
There, Yag˘an established zero-one laws for the absence of
isolated nodes (i.e., absence of nodes with degree zero) and
1-connectivity. Our work generalizes Yag˘an’s results on two
levels. Firstly, we consider more practical WSN scenarios
where the unreliability of wireless communication channels
are taken into account through the on/off channel model.
Secondly, in addition to the property that the graph has no
isolated nodes (i.e., the minimum node degree is no less than
1), we also establish results for a general minimum node
degree k = 0, 1, . . ..
Finally, our work (with αn = 1 for each n = 2, 3, . . .)
improves upon the results by Zhao et al. [11] for the minimum
node degree in the inhomogeneous random key graph; therein,
this model was referred to as the general random intersec-
tion graph. Even though Zhao et al. [11] considered strong
graph properties including k-connectivity and k-robustness,
the additional conditions required by their main result renders
it inapplicable in practical WSN implementations. This issue
is discussed at length in [7, Section 3.3], but we give a
summary here for completeness. With Xn denoting the random
variable representing the number of keys assigned to an
arbitrary node in the network, the main result in [11] requires
Var[Xn] = o
(
(E[X])2
n(logn)2
)
, which implies that
E[Xn] = ω(
√
n logn). (7)
Particularly, the results in [11] hold only if the mean num-
ber of keys assigned to a sensor node is much larger than√
n logn. However, in most WSN applications, sensor nodes
will have very limited memory and computational capabilities
[1]. Therefore, the condition (7) is not likely to hold in large
WSNs. Instead, the only condition required by our main result
can be seen to be E[Xn] = o(
√
Pn).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present numerical results to support Theorem 3.1 in
the finite node regime. In all experiments, we fix the number of
nodes at n = 500 and the size of the key pool at P = 104. For
better visualization, we use the curve fitting tool of MATLAB.
In Figure 1, we consider the channel parameters α = 0.2,
α = 0.4, α = 0.6, and α = 0.8, while varying the parameter
K1, i.e., the smallest key ring size, from 5 to 40. The number
of classes is fixed to 2, with µ = {0.5, 0.5}. For each value of
K1, we set K2 = K1+10. For each parameter pair (K,α), we
generate 200 independent samples of the graph K ∩G(n;θ, α)
and count the number of times (out of a possible 200) that the
obtained graphs i) have minimum node degree no less than
2 and ii) are 2-connected. Dividing the counts by 200, we
obtain the (empirical) probabilities for the events of interest.
In all cases considered here, we observe that K ∩G(n;θ, α)
is 2-connected whenever it has minimum node degree no
less than 2 yielding the same empirical probability for both
events. This supports our conjecture that the properties of k-
connectivity and minimum node degree being larger than k
are asymptotically equivalent in K ∩G(n;θ, α).
For each α value, we show the critical threshold of k-
connectivity “predicted” by Theorem 3.1 by a vertical dashed
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Fig. 1. Empirical probability that K ∩ G(n;θ, α) is 2-connected as a function
of K for α = 0.2, α = 0.4, α = 0.6, α = 0.8 with n = 500 and P = 104.
In each case, the empirical probability value is obtained by averaging over
200 experiments. Vertical dashed lines stand for the critical threshold of 2-
connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.1.
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Fig. 2. Empirical probability that K ∩ G(n;θ, α) is k-connected as a
function of K1 for k = 4, k = 6, k = 8, and k = 10, with n = 500
and P = 104 . In each case, the empirical probability value is obtained by
averaging over 200 experiments. Vertical dashed lines stand for the critical
threshold of k-connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.1.
line. More specifically, the vertical dashed lines stand for the
minimum integer value of K1 that satisfies
λ1(n) =
2∑
j=1
µj
(
1−
(
P−Kj
K1
)
(
P
K1
)
)
>
1
α
logn+ log logn
n
. (8)
We see from Figure 1 that the probability of k-connectivity
transitions from zero to one within relatively small variations
in K1. Moreover, the critical values of K1 obtained by (8) lie
within the transition interval.
In Figure 2, we consider four different values for k, namely
we set k = 4, k = 6, k = 8, and k = 10 while varying
K1 from 15 to 40. The number of classes is fixed to 2 with
µ = {0.5, 0.5} and we set K2 = K1+10 for each value of K1.
Using the same procedure that produced Figure 1, we obtain
the empirical probability that K ∩G(n;θ, α) is k-connected
versus K1. The critical threshold of k-connectivity asserted
by Theorem 3.1 is shown by a vertical dashed line in each
curve.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is lengthy and technically in-
volved. Therefore, we omit the details in this conference
version. All details can be found in [21]. In this section, we
present an outline of our proof. The proof of Theorem 3.1
relies on the methods of first and second moments (See [22,
p. 55]) applied to the number of nodes with degree ℓ in
K ∩G(n;Θn). Let Xℓ(n;Θn) denote the total number of
nodes with degree ℓ in K ∩G(n;Θn), namely,
Xℓ(n;Θn) =
n∑
i=1
1 [Di,ℓ(n;Θn)] (9)
where Di,ℓ(n;Θn) denotes the event that node vi in
K ∩G(n;Θn) has degree ℓ for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Through-
out, we simplify the notation by writing Di,ℓ instead of
Di,ℓ(n;Θn).
By using the methods of first and second moments we obtain
P [Xℓ(n;Θn) = 0] ≤ 1− E [Xℓ(n;Θn)]
2
E [Xℓ(n;Θn)2]
, (10)
and
P [Xℓ(n;Θn) = 0] ≥ 1− E [Xℓ(n;Θn)] (11)
Recalling (9), we get
E [Xℓ(n;Θn)] =
n∑
i=1
P [Di,ℓ] = nP [Dx,ℓ] (12)
upon using the exchangeability of the indicator rvs
{1 [Di,ℓ] ; i = 1, . . . , n}. Similarly, it is easy to see that
E
[
(Xℓ(n;Θn))
2
]
= nP [Dx,ℓ] + n(n− 1)P [Dx,ℓ ∩Dy,ℓ]
(13)
Combining (12) and (13), we obtain
E
[
Xℓ(n;Θn)
2
]
E [Xℓ(n;Θn)]
2 =
1
nP [Dx,ℓ]
+
(
n− 1
n
)
P [Dx,ℓ ∩Dy,ℓ]
{P [Dx,ℓ]}2
.
(14)
The one-law states that the minimum node degree in
K ∩G(n;Θn) is no less than k asymptotically almost surely
(a.a.s.). Put differently, the one-law requires that the graph has
no nodes with degree ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
P [Xℓ(n;Θn) = 0] = 1, ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, (15)
In view of (11) and (12), we see that (15) and hence the one-
law would follow upon showing
lim
n→∞
nP [Dx,ℓ] = 0, ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. (16)
For the zero-law, we need to show that there exists ℓ =
0, 1, . . . , k − 1 such that
lim
n→∞
P [Xℓ(n;Θn) = 0] = 0. (17)
In other words, we need to show that there is at least one
node with degree ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, so that the minimum
node degree in K ∩G(n;Θn) is less than k a.a.s.
In view of (10) and (14), (17) will follow if we show that
lim
n→∞
nP [Dx,ℓ] =∞, (18)
and
P [Dx,ℓ ∩Dy,ℓ] ∼ {P [Dx,ℓ]}2 , (19)
for some ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 under the enforced assumptions.
Collecting, the proof of Theorem 3.1 passes through estab-
lishing (16), (18), and (19) under appropriate conditions. Due
to space limitations, details are given in [21].
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